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Azerbaijan’s New Macroeconomic Reality: How to Adapt to Low Oil Prices
By Ingilab Ahmadov, Baku
Abstract
Despite the accumulation of significant revenues from crude oil exports and remarkable economic growth 
over the past 15 years, Azerbaijan’s economy has been hit hard by the recent drop in global oil prices and 
has experienced a period of painful economic adjustments. The government has attempted to change the 
traditional distributive approach that is based largely on oil revenue distribution in favor of a new earning-
oriented model that is expected to benefit from a robust non-oil sector. It is clear that the oil price slump 
caught the government off guard and poorly prepared to cope with the new low price environment. Clearly, 
it will be difficult to build a new model of development quickly and thoroughly in a short period of time. 
While the availability of the state oil fund reserves mitigates the risk of financial and macroeconomic col-
lapse in the near future, the effects of a large informal economy make it difficult to regulate the economy 
using only conventional instruments, such as money supply and credits. Thus, to be effective, authorities’ 
anti-crisis measures should be accompanied by institutional and administrative reforms.
Oil Price Drop and National Currency 
Devaluation
Azerbaijan is one of the most oil-dependent countries 
in the world. In 2015, the oil sector generated 31% of 
the country’s GDP (compared with 52% in 2011), and 
oil revenues accounted for 63% of the state budget and 
amounted to 86% of total exports. Unsurprisingly, as 
in other oil-dependent economies, the drop in world oil 
prices has had a significant impact on Azerbaijan’s econ-
omy. Moreover, the consequences turned out worse than 
expected. Last year, the Azerbaijani currency (manat) 
was devaluated twice and lost most of its value.
Similar to other oil-rich Caspian Basin states, namely 
Russia and Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan’s national currency 
lost its value relative to the U.S. dollar and Euro. How-
ever, whereas Russia and Kazakhstan began to weaken 
their national currencies in 2014, Azerbaijan held its 
currency at a firmly stable rate in the hope of a return 
to favorable oil prices. Another peculiarity in this case is 
that both times that Azerbaijan devalued its currency, it 
did so sharply and not smoothly, which differs from the 
approach taken by Russia and Kazakhstan. Of course, 
in the Russian case, sanctions have had a  significant 
impact on the ruble as well.
In terms of macroeconomic implications, currency 
devaluation was considered not only as a way to main-
tain monetary stability but also as a measure of fiscal 
and budget stabilization. As in Russia and Kazakhstan, 
the Azerbaijani state budget consists mainly of oil and 
gas revenues and therefore devaluation of the local cur-
rency allows the country to generate and transfer more 
earnings from the export of crude oil because the cur-
rency of the oil trade is the U.S. dollar.
The new socio-economic environment that emerged 
thereafter was painful for all social groups but partic-
ularly for the most vulnerable. Most investment pro-
grams, including public investment projects financed 
through the state budget and the State Oil Company 
(SOCAR), have been curtailed. SOCAR’s capital-
intensive investment projects were frozen, such as con-
struction of a new oil refinery worth an estimated US$ 
18 billion.
Following the manat’s devaluation, the country’s 
ranking in the world economy fell sharply: GDP per 
capita dropped 56%. By the end of 2015, annual GDP 
per capita in Azerbaijan stood at US$ 7,986; at present, 
that amount is only US$ 3,490.
Two other indicators are noteworthy as well. Before 
the national currency devaluation, Azerbaijan’s public 
debt to GDP ratio was one of the lowest among oil-pro-
ducing states, but today this is no longer the case. Public 
external debt to GDP (as of January 1, 2016) stands at 
19.8%, whereas it was only 8.6% one year before (Min-
istry of Finance of Azerbaijan).
Figure 1: Devaluation of the National Currencies in Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan and Russia in Light of Low Oil Prices
Source: Author’s calculation based on statistical data from the 
central banks of the three countries
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Fortunately for Azerbaijan, in the post-devaluation 
period the assets of the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) are 
expected to rise to almost 100% of GDP this year (up 
from approximately 50% of GDP in 2014). This is the 
highest indicator among oil-rich countries in the region, 
where comparable figures for Russia and Kazakhstan are 
10% and 35%, respectively.
Figure 2: Azerbaijan: GDP Growth Rate, 2010–2016 (% 
change, year-to-year, year-to-date, preliminary monthly 
estimate)
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit
The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan as an 
Airbag
Azerbaijan’s oil revenue management system is based 
on combining SOFAZ and public budget mechanisms, 
whereby most oil revenues accumulate in the Fund and 
will be used for future spending on various investment 
projects directly and through the state budget.
As the biggest share of annual expenditures of the 
Fund are transfers to the state budget (in 2015, 88 % of 
SOFAZ expenditures were transfers to the public bud-
get, amounting to 47% of the state budget revenues), in 
this current period of rapid change, this factor became 
a good benchmark at which to peg the exchange rate 
and prevent further devaluations of the manat.
From January to mid-March 2016, SOFAZ sold US 
dollars worth more than US$ 1 billion at a newly cre-
ated auction marketplace, which is a significant oppor-
tunity for the domestic exchange market. It was a nec-
essary step, as SOFAZ has to make regular transfers 
to the state budget in manat. In addition, this helps 
the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) to save its for-
eign reserves. Notably, the government has shown no 
intention of expanding the use of SOFAZ’s assets to 
maintain the fiscal balance, as was the case with some 
other oil exporting states. Instead, the dramatic deval-
uation of the national currency gives the government 
an opportunity to save more of the Fund’s assets for 
the future.
The Favorable Oil Climate of the 2000s
The last decade’s commodities super cycle was quite 
bene ficial for Azerbaijan’s economic growth. Fortunately, 
this period coincided with an increase in Azerbaijani 
oil production following the signing of the “Contract 
of the Century” for the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli deep-
water fields, explored and developed in cooperation with 
global oil giants, including BP, ExxonMobil, and other 
multinationals.
Between 2004 and 2011, Azerbaijan’s GDP growth 
was 15%, on average. In comparison, Russian GDP 
growth for this period was 4%, and Kazakhstan’s growth 
was 7%.1 Due to the enormous oil revenues generated 
during this favorable oil price super cycle, Azerbaijan’s 
public budget grew by more than a factor of 25. All three 
countries established a sovereign wealth fund (in Rus-
sia, two funds), which have accumulated sizeable finan-
cial reserves.2 These funds are expected to contribute to 
financial stability in the long run. By the end of 2014, 
the total amount accumulated in Russia’s National Wel-
fare Fund and Reserve Fund was estimated at US$180 
billion (9% of GDP). Moreover, the National Fund of 
Kazakhstan had accumulated US$ 69 billion (30% of 
GDP), while the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) 
had accumulated US$ 36 billion (47% of GDP).
The current financial turmoil calls the official opin-
ion of the government into question. During the oil 
boom period, Azerbaijani authorities declared that the 
country had reached a sufficient level of socio-economic 
sustainability. Moreover, the chaotic decisions of the 
government indicate that it prepared poorly for low 
commodity prices. The government does not seem to 
have any clear strategy for adapting to the new reality.
Another essential problem is the disparity between 
official statistical information and the real picture, such 
as the volume of real cash flow (dollarization), traded 
goods in the domestic economy (some imported goods 
are not declared at the customs agency), tax avoidance, 
and other practices that constitute the informal econ-
omy. Ultimately, the cause of this disparity is the inef-
ficiency in the existing institutional framework, includ-
ing customs, tax collection, and antimonopoly agencies.
According to official statistics, the volume of the 
informal economy is 7% of GDP, which is likely to be 
a modest estimate. World Bank experts’ calculations 
1 UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013, <http://
w w w.un.org/en/development/desa /policy/wesp/wesp_
current/2013annex_tables.pdf>
2 Ingilab Ahmadov, Stela Tsani, and Kenan Aslanli, “Sovereign 
Wealth Funds as the Emerging Players in the Global Finan-
cial Arena”, Public Finance Monitoring Centre and Revenue 
Watch Institute (2009), <http://www.khazar.org/files/SWFs_
new_book_RWI_PFMC.pdf>
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put the extent of informal economic activity at 32% of 
the country’s GDP as of 2008.3
The negative consequence of the informal economy 
for the government, which needs to tackle exchange rate 
stability and predictability, is a lack of effective mone-
tary and other economic instruments to influence the 
market. The sizeable informal economy implies there 
is an unaccounted amount of dollars in cash holdings, 
sales, services transactions, and household real income. 
It also points to widespread tax evasion. Informal trans-
actions impede the implementation of an effective mac-
roeconomic policy.
The government’s lack of a holistic approach to man-
aging oil price downturns and its weakness in design-
ing an anti-crisis program comprise another set of prob-
lems that became clear during the ongoing perturbations 
that began at the end of last year. The effective coor-
dination of monetary, fiscal and social policies, based 
on a clear set of priorities in the post-oil period, which 
seems to have begun, is now the government’s most 
important challenge.
However, Azerbaijan’s predicament is not merely 
a consequence of low commodity prices. The country’s 
economic problems were mounting before the crisis due 
to the poorly diversified structure of its economy and 
the absence of strict fiscal rules. Beginning in 2005, the 
enormous expenditures associated with ineffective and 
non-transparent spending show the economy in a neg-
ative light.
Figure 3: Azerbaijan: GDP Growth and Total Natural 
Resource Rents (%)
Source: The World Data Bank, World Development Indicators
3 Yasser Abdih and Leandro Medina, “Measuring the Informal 
Economy in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, IMF Working 
Paper WP/13/137, May 2013, <http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13137.pdf>
Today, amidst macroeconomic deterioration, it is clear 
that something went wrong. As British economist Paul 
Collier put it, “And the supercycle of the last ten years 
has been the biggest opportunity that they’ve had in his-
tory. And for most of them, it’s been a missed oppor-
tunity. And so it’s really important, society by society, 
to discover what went wrong and what is needed to be 
understood in order for next time to go better.”4
How Successfully Has the Government 
Reacted?
The government is taking active steps to tackle the chal-
lenges of macroeconomic balancing. Its policy actions 
so far may be divided into three groups:
1. Strengthening Financial Security and 
Predictability
Until now, the government has mostly concentrated 
on exchange rate stability. Immediately following the 
December 2015 devaluation, the financial sector endured 
chaos for some time, and the government did its best to 
prevent further instability of the national currency. As 
usual, the further decline of the manat led to specula-
tions on the black market. The first steps were nervous, 
chaotic and unsystematic. The government decided to 
close exchange offices and concentrated all exchange 
operations only in the banks and their branches. It was 
clear that this reaction was associated with the flight 
of capital. Finally, the government successfully main-
tained the stability of the exchange market and tackled 
the foreign exchange rate. For this, it used additional 
interventions from the foreign currency reserves of the 
central bank (CBA).
Some administrative steps were also taken, such as 
the establishment of a new legal entity called the Finan-
cial Market Control Chamber. The mission of this entity 
is to ensure public control of the country’s securities 
market, investment funds, banking and insurance sec-
tors, as well as the flexibility and transparency of the 
activities of payment systems (www.president.az). Due 
to the changes to the Law on Banks, some functions of 
the CBA were delegated to the newly established Con-
trol Chamber. The changes also downgrade the CBA’s 
powers of supervision over the banking sector.
2. Liberalization of the Economy and 
Improving its Entrepreneurship Space
It is clear that an essential reason for the painful ramifi-
cations of the commodity price decline in Azerbaijan is 
4 Paul Collier, “The Decision Chain of Natural Resource Man-
agement (I)”, Global Heritages, February 5, 2016, <https://glo 
balherit.hypotheses.org/4710>.
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the lack of a robust and competitive domestic business 
sector. The economic diversification policy, declared as 
a priority at the start of the oil boom, was not realized 
in practice. Barriers to stimulating domestic business 
development are mostly problems involving access to 
capital markets and monopolization of most segments 
of the markets. These distortions prevent the growth 
of local businesses. If the windfall of oil revenues com-
pensated for the lack of an open business environment 
during the oil boom, the absence of a competitive envi-
ronment today hampers the recovery of the economy 
over the long term.
Over the last two months, the President of Azer-
baijan has issued more than a dozen decrees and other 
official documents aimed at encouraging local business 
development. This business support program includes 
the following measures: i) promotion of non-oil prod-
ucts for export, ii) reform of the customs agency, and iii) 
simplified procedures for issuing licenses and permits.
These decisions should give the business environ-
ment the necessary momentum to stimulate real eco-
nomic diversification and eventually reduce the coun-
try’s heavy dependence on petroleum.
3. Institutional Reforms to Support 
Development of the Non-Oil Sector
Institutional reform seems to be the most difficult task 
but is crucial if Azerbaijan is to adapt to the new low 
oil price era and build a desirable model of development 
that is sustainable in the long term.
Like many other oil dependent countries, the gov-
ernment of Azerbaijan is also considering privatiza-
tion of state property as leverage and as an incremen-
tal source of budget income. Notably, the government 
did not pay adequate attention to privatization during 
the super-cycle oil boom of the 2000s, neither as lever-
age for business development nor as a source of revenue 
for the state budget. In the case of the budget, this was 
not necessary as oil revenues covered the budget needs 
with excess remaining.
Thus, most of the state property inherited from the 
Soviet legacy had little business potential and was essen-
tially trash. In this regard, the Presidential decree on 
privatization of February 16, 2016 should be considered 
a continuation of the “State Program of Privatization of 
State Property” dated 10 August 2000.
All these efforts are necessary, but not sufficient. The 
government should recognize that the weak currency 
opens up enormous opportunities for local business, 
particularly farmers. However, in order to fully realize 
the potential of the emerging new environment the gov-
ernment should undertake fundamental liberalization 
reforms that would streamline the work of customs ser-
vices and address the omnipotence of local authorities.
Conclusion
In sum, it is evident that the US$ 34 billion sovereign 
wealth fund (SOFAZ) diminishes the risks of financial 
and macroeconomic collapse in the near future. In prac-
tice, the rainy day oil fund operates as an airbag more 
or less successfully. Bolstered by significant foreign cur-
rency reserves, SOFAZ helps fix the fiscal deficit. The 
oil fund plays an active role in stabilizing the exchange 
rate by withdrawing the strategic currency reserves from 
the central bank and selling US dollars at currency auc-
tions. In 2015, the central bank depleted US$ 9 billion 
of its strategic reserves to defend the national currency 
from sliding against the dollar.
However, the presence of a large informal economic 
sector makes it difficult to regulate the economy using 
only traditional instruments, such as money supply and 
credits. The official macroeconomic statistical accounts, 
particularly money indicators, may not accurately reflect 
the real picture. This is not only due to the imperfect 
work of the statistical agency. Typical institutional prob-
lems impede the gathering of information concerning 
customs- and tax-related transactions. Therefore, it is 
important to ensure that the government’s anti-crisis 
steps are backed by institutional and administrative 
leverage. Without institutional reforms, it is unrealis-
tic to expect that the anti-crisis policies will yield sub-
stantive and successful results.
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